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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
the college attempted at trial to justify this treatment by distinguishing
rule infraction by individuals from rule infraction by a group of faculty
members, the dissent concluded that the disparate treatment and the
purported distinction amounted only to "an admission that Shaw and
Winn were discharged because they acted in concert with their fellows to
protest a college policy."4 Thus the school could not have demonstrated
that in the absence of the protected conduct the plaintiffs would have been
dismissed because in prior instances of violations without the protected
conduct offenders were not dismissed.
If the Shaw majority had adopted such a test, rather than the simple
"real motivation" criterion, its attention might have focused on the pro-
tected conduct of the teachers and not on the arguably proper conduct of
the school. Such an approach would follow a prior Fourth Circuit case in
which the court expressly mentioned that comparison to other instances
of the same misconduct is a valuable tool in determining the extent of first
amendment protection." Generally, such an approach would seem conso-
nant with the traditionally high value placed on first amendment activity,
even in the restricted environment of the classroom.45
EDITORIAL STAFF
IV. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Federal Statutes and the Common Law
Federal criminal code sections often designate specified activities as
criminal without precisely defining those activities.1 Courts have held that
such undefined terms should be given their common law or ordinary mean-
ing.2 Serious problems have arisen as persons engaging in criminal pursuits
13 Id.
" See Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d
177 (4th Cir. 1966). In Chitwood the court remanded, seeking to know "how many other
untenured teachers had engaged in comparable speech and how many of them had their
contracts terminated." 468 F.2d at 361. In Johnson, the Fourth Circuit stated that "absent
the special question [the alleged impermissible motive], the issue would not have arisen."
364 F.2d at 182.
15 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970). Section 2314 proscribes the transportation in inter-
state commerce with fraudulent intent of "any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited
securities . . . ," but does not define any of those terms.
2 See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 172 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1949). But see Bergman v.
United States, 253 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1958). An important issue in both Wright and Bergman
was the determination of definitions for terms not statutorily defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2314
(1970).
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engendered by newly developed technology have been prosecuted under
voluminous, often overlapping federal statutes which incorporate anti-
quated common law provisions. The Senate Judiciary Committee, recog-
nizing these deficiencies in the current federal criminal statutes, has ap-
proved a bill which, if passed by Congress, will completely revise the crimi-
nal code by proscribing new types of criminal activity and eliminating
some traditional technical distinctions between common law crimes.3 Sev-
eral recent Fourth Circuit cases illustrate the need for these changes in the
federal criminal code.
United States v. Jones4 demonstrates the deficiencies of section 2314 of
the criminal code dealing with the interstate transportation of stolen goods
and fraudulent documents.' In Jones, the appellee's accomplice had fed
false information into a computer of a Canadian company. As a result, the
computer printed a check payable to the appellee Jones although the com-
pany in fact owed no debt to Jones.'
The appellant in Wright had been convicted of transporting forged securities in interstate
commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 415 (1940), the predecessor and equivalent of § 2314.
The Wright court held that the undefined terms "falsely made" and "forged" in § 415 should
be given their common ordinary meaning. 172 F.2d at 311.
The defendant in Bergman had been convicted of violating § 2314 by knowingly trans-
porting stolen goods in interstate commerce. Although § 2314 offers no definition of "stolen,"
the Sixth Circuit held that, to sustain a conviction under § 2314, the prosecution need not
prove the commission of a common law larceny. 253 F.2d at 935. However, the Bergman court
did not explain the standard by which the trial court should have determined whether an
article was stolen.
The Senate Judiciary Committee approved S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1Q77), the
Senate's comprehensive criminal code revision bill, on November 2, 1977. See Cong. Q.
Weekly Rep., November 5, 1977 at 2364. The bill, if enacted, will greatly reduce the number
of federal substantive offenses by creating simpler, more comprehensive provisions which will
encompass activities proscribed by the less inclusive, but more numerous, provisions of the
current criminal code. See Cong. Q. Weekly Rep., October 15, 1977 at 2190. For example,
the versions of S. 1437 approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee would reduce the fifty
false statement measures, eighty counterfeiting and forgery statutes, and seventy theft provi-
sions of the present federal criminal code to three false statement and perjury sections and a
single basic theft provision. The sentencing provisions of S. 1437 stress predictability and
uniformity of sentence for each particular offense, severely curtailing the sentencing discre-
tion currently enjoyed by federal judges. See Cong. Q. Weekly Rep., November 5, 1977 at
2190.
4 553 F.2d 351 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3807 (U.S. June 14, 1977) (No. 76-
1586).
5 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970). See note 1 supra.
' After the check was printed, the defendant caused the check to be transported to her
home in Maryland, where she deposited the check in her bank account. 553 F.2d at 354.
The incidence of the use of computers in the commission of crime has increased dramati-
cally in the United States in recent years. See Bequai, A Survey of Fraud and Privacy
Obstacles to the Development of an Electronic Funds Transfer System, 25 CATH. U.L. REV.
766, 772-81 (1976). The ease with which a skilled computer programmer can alter information
on existing computer programs and input false information, and the difficulty of detecting
program alteration are important reasons for this computer crime wave. See Nycum,
Computer Abuses Raise New Legal Problems, 61 A.B.A.J. 444, 446 (1975). The proliferation
of computer crime has raised serious questions concerning the ability of existing criminal
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The issue addressed by the Jones court was whether appellee's activi-
ties fell within the exclusionary clause of section 2314, which states that
the provisions of 2314 do not apply to "any falsely made, forged, altered,
counterfeited or spurious representation" of a "security . . .issued by a
corporation of any foreign county." Since the Canadian corporation was a
foreign corporation and had issued a security in the form of a check, the
dispositive issue was whether the check had been "falsely made, forged,
altered, or counterfeited." 7 Reversing the district court's dismissal of the
indictment against the defendant, the Fourth Circuit held that the defen-
dant's activities were not within the terms of the section 2314 exclusionary
clause.8
The Jones court stated that the section 2314 exclusionary clause lan-
guage, "falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited" defines common
law forgery,9 and that false making and forgery are substantially synony-
statutes to deal with the problems presented by computer crimes. For example, computer
programs may be altered or rendered inoperable in certain situations by persons working from
a remote terminal miles from the computer. If information is stolen from a computer in such
a situation, the prosecutor would be forced to decide whether to seek an indictment for
trespass, burglary, malicious mischief, or some other offense. Id. at 445. The outcome of a
trial resulting from such a manipulation of a computer could depend upon whether the
prosecutor could successfully demonstrate that the defendant's actions fit the technical re-
quirement for each crime as established under the common law.
Recognizing the serious nature of computer crime, Congress may soon simplify federal
prosecution of computer criminals. A bill has been introduced in Congress which would make
it a crime to use computers owned by the federal government or other "entities affecting
interstate commerce" "for fraudulent or other illegal purposes." See S. 1766 § 3, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 8421, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The bill, if passed by Congress, would
proscribe the use of a computer "for the purpose of devising or executing any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or obtaining money, property, or services by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises. . ." S. 1766 § 3. Thus, under S. 1766, the prosecution
must necessarily prove fraudulent intent, although proof of the commission of a common law
crime such as forgery or counterfeiting is not required.
7 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970).
553 F.2d at 356.
Id. at 354. The Jones court relied on Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512 (4th
Cir. 1948), to establish that the words "falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited" indi-
cate the crime of forgery. Id. The Greathouse court held that "the words, 'falsely made,
forged, altered, or counterfeited' in the collocation in which they appeared are ejusdem
generis and are usually employed to denounce the crime of forgery." Id. at 514.
The principle of ejusdem generis requires that a broad or comprehensive statutory term
which follows specific terms having only one meaning shall not be construed to its widest
extent, but must be construed to mean the sense of the broad term which is most closely
associated with the previously enumerated specific term or terms. See diLeo v. Greenfield,
541 F.2d 949, 954 (2d Cir. 1976); Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir. 1963);
H. BLACK, INTERPREATION OF LAWS § 71 (2d ed. 1911). The Greathouse court gave no reason
why it applied the ejusdem generis principle to the terms "falsely made, forged, altered, or
counterfeited." Presumably, the court determined "forged" to be a specific term which was
followed by the more general terms "altered or counterfeited." Under this presumption, the
terms "altered or counterfeited" should be construed to indicate the meanings of these words
most closely associated with forgery. See H. BLACK INTERPR-TATION OF LAWS § 71 (2d ed. 1911).
Thus, "altered or counterfeited" are simply modifiers of the controlling expression of the
phrase, which is "forged," leading to the conclusion that the entire phrase defines the crime
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mous.'5 Thus, a false making had to be established to include defendant's
activities within the exclusionary clause. False making of an instrument
is the creation of an instrument which is not genuine, because the instru-
ment is not, in fact, what it purports to be." False making can be distin-
guished from the making of a genuine instrument which contains false
statements.'" The falsely made instrument is an entirely bogus creation,
but the genuine instrument containing a false statement would be a valid,
enforceable obligation if it did not contain the false statements.,3
Since the check payable to defendant did not constitute a false writing,
the Jones court held that it did not constitute a forgery.'4 The check was
what it purported to be, an obligation of the Canadian company as the
apparent maker of the check. The check, however, contained the implicit
of forgery. This conclusion is not convincing, however, for the term "counterfeited" seems to
be as precise and definite a term as "forged."
,o Id. at 354; see Marteney v. United States, 216 F.2d 760, 763 (10th Cir. 1954); Wright
v. United States, 172 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1949); Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d
512, 514 (4th Cir. 1948).
In Wright, the Ninth Circuit defined forgery as "the false making or materially altering,
with intent to defraud, of any writing, which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy
or the foundation of a legal liability." 172 F.2d at 311. Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, proof of a
false making is not necessary to demonstrate the occurrence of a forgery because a forgery
may be predicated upon a "material altering." See Id. at 311.
Proof of false making, or false writing, is absolutely necessary to sustain a § 2314 convic-
tion for forgery in the Fourth and Tenth Circuits. In Greathouse, the Fourth Circuit held that
the terms falsely made and forged are virtually synonymous when used as they are in § 2314.
170 F.2d at 514. Accord, 216 F.2d 763.
1 See Wright v. United States, 172 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1949). The genuineness of a
document is not determined by the veracity of statements appearing on a document. A
document is genuine if the apparent maker of the document did actually make the document
and the instrument is actually what it appears to be. See Baldwin v. Van Deusen, 37 N.Y.
487, 492-93 (1868). Thus, a counterfeited U.S. Federal Reserve Note is not genuine, since the
government, the apparent maker, did not actually make the note, and because the counter-
feited bill is not what it appears to be, an obligation of the federal government. The counter-
feiting of the bill is thus a false making.
12 The distinction between false making of a writing and the making of a writing which
contains false statements was recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Staats,
49 U.S. (8 How.) 41 (1850). In Staats, the defendant had been convicted of forgery for
procuring the creation of documents to support his claim for benefits under a Revolutionary
War veterans' pension statute. Id. at 43. The defendant argued that his conviction could be
reversed, since the document was genuine as to execution, but contained false statements.
The Supreme Court recognized this distinction but affirmed defendant's conviction on the
ground that the statute at issue allowed conviction for the creation of a writing which con-
tained false statements, as well as for forgery, or creation of a false writing. Id. at 47.
A genuine writing containing false statements was found in Marteney v. United States,
216 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1954). In Marteney, the defendant had altered a valid warehouse
receipt so that the receipt represented more grain in the warehouse than defendant had
actually stored. In holding that defendant's transportation of the receipt in interstate com-
merce was not a violation of § 2314, the Tenth Circuit noted that the receipt had not been
forged or falsely made, but was a genuine instrument which simply contained false informa-
tion. Id. at 763-64.
13 See Wright v. United States, 172 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1949).
11 553 F.2d at 355.
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false statement that the company owed a debt to the defendant in the
amount printed on the check."5 Had the company actually owed the defen-
dant the debt indicated on the check, the check would have been a valid
enforceable instrument. Thus, the check was not a falsely made instru-
ment, but was a genuine instrument which contained a false statement.
The check was therefore not a forgery and the exclusionary clause of sec-
tion 2314 did not apply.
There are other problems with the incorporation of common law defini-
tions into the terms of section 2314. For example, the Fourth Circuit in
United States v. Pomponiol6 considered the application of common law
definitions of counterfeiting that have been incorporated by federal courts
into the broad proscription of section 2314 against the fraudulent interstate
transportation of counterfeited securities." In Pomponio, the court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the defendant's acts constituted common law
counterfeiting since the evidence confirmed the satisfaction of the other
section 2314 requirements.
The defendant Pomponio had been the owner of all the stock in a
corporation. The defendant pledged all the stock to one Murray as collat-
eral for the performance of an obligation by issuing him stock certificates
numbered one, two, and three. The defendant then pledged the exact same
stock to one McShane by issuing him other stock certificates numbered-
one, two, and three.'" The Fourth Circuit found that the mere fact that
defendant issued the second set of certificates did not constitute the crime
of counterfeiting. The court conceded that a simple misrepresentation of
the value of the certificates would not be sufficient to sustain a section 2314
conviction based on counterfeiting.'9 The Pomponio court concluded, how-
Id.
" 558 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1977).
,7 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970) provides that "whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent,
transports in interstate . . . commerce any ... counterfeited securities ... knowing the
same to have been ... counterfeited shall be fined ... or imprisoned. .. ."
" 558 F.2d at 1174. In consideration for the issuance of the second set of certificates,
McShane endorsed a promissory note in favor of the defendant, who negotiated part of the
note and travelled from Pennsylvania to Virginia with the proceeds from the negotiation, a
$2,000,000 cashier's check. This interstate transportation of the check brought the defen-
dant's action within the scope of § 2314. Id. at 1173-74.
1" The mere fraudulent misrepresentation of the value of the second set of stock certifi-
cates constituted a making of a genuine instrument which contained false information. 558
F.2d at 1174, citing Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650 (1962); see Marteney v. United
States, 216 F.2d 760, 763 (10th Cir. 1954); Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512, 514
(4th Cir. 1948).
In Greathouse, the defendant had represented to the bank that he had authority to sign
a check payable to himself in the name of a third party. The defendant signed the third
party's name, endorsed the check in his own name, and cashed the check. The Greathouse
court found that the defendant had not violated § 2314, since the bank was aware that it was
the defendant who had signed the third party's name, and thus no false making had occurred.
170 F.2d at 514. Marteney involved a warehouse receipt which represented goods which the
defendant owned, but which listed a greater quantity of the goods than were stored in the
warehouse, due to the defendant's alteration of the receipt. The Tenth Circuit held that the
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ever, that the defendant's acts of purchasing a new stock book and num-
bering the second set of certificates one, two and three were an attempt to
simulate the first set of certificates and held that the second set of certifi-
cates was a counterfeit of the first set.
2
1
Prior to the Pomponio decision, the Fourth Circuit had determined that
the term "counterfeited" means "imitated, simulated, feigned, or pre-
tended."'" This general definition 2  did not enumerate the specific elements
that constitute common law counterfeiting.2 In contrast, a more precise
definition of the term "counterfeit" cited by the Pomponio court, adopted
by the Sixth Circuit in Richland Trust Co. v. Federal Insurance Co., 24 and
recently approved by the Ninth Circuit," indicates that "counterfeit"
means "an imitation of a genuine document having a resemblance in-
tended to deceive and be taken for the original."2 The Pomponio court's
determination that the second set of certificates were counterfeits of the
first set was made "in light of" the Fourth Circuit and Richland Trust
definitions .
27
The Pomponio court's holding that the defendant had counterfeited his
own stock certificates was proper under the Fourth Circuit definition of
"counterfeited" since the defendant "feigned" or "pretended" that the
certificates represented all the stock in his company. However, the Fourth
'Circuit finding that "counterfeited" means "imitated, simulated, feigned,
or pretended"2 is so broad and inclusive that it possibly would be impru-
defendant's transportation of the receipt was not violative of § 2314 since the receipt was
genuine, but contained false information. 216 F.2d at 763. In Gilbert, the appellant negotiated
government checks by signing his own name, stating that he was the agent of the payee. 370
U.S. at 652. The Supreme Court held that this act did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 415 (1940),
the predecessor and equivalent of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970), since the bank cashed the check,
not in reliance of a false writing, but in reliance on defendant's misrepresentation that he
was the payee's agent. 370 U.S. at 657.
Even if the second set of certificates in Pomponio had not physically resembled the first
set, the defendant's actions constituted a state criminal offense. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
4114 (1973) (Purdon) states that an individual commits an offense if "by deception he causes
another to execute any instrument affecting or purporting to affect or likely to affect the
pecuniary interest of any person." McShane executed his promissory note in favor of the
defendant because the defendant had deceived him into the belief that the certificates which
McShane had received represented all the stock in Pomponio's corporation. The execution
of the promissory note adversely affected McShane's pecuniary interest. Therefore, the defen-
dant's activity, see 558 F.2d at 1152, was within the ambit of the Pennsylvania statute.
558 F.2d at 1174.
2, United States v. Smith, 318 F.2d 94, 95 (4th Cir. 1963), citing 2 OXFORD DiCrIoNARY
1066 (1933 ed.).
u E.g., Id. citing 2 OXFORD DIMTONARY 1066 (1933 ed.).
21 The Smith court derived its definition of "counterfeited" from the Oxford Dictionary,
a nonlegal source. See 2 OXFORD DIXMONARY 1066 (1933 ed.).
24 494 F.2d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1974).
11 See United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 1976), quoting Union
Banking Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 4 Ohio App. 2d 397, 213 N.E.2d 191, 196 (1965).
2 494 F.2d at 642, quoted in, 532 F.2d at 1224.
2 558 F.2d at 1174.
2' See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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dent to sustain a 2314 conviction on such weak authority alone.
The defendant's actions in Pomponio do not appear to constitute
"counterfeiting" within the Richland Trust meaning of the term. When the
defendant issued the second set of certificates to McShane, he assured the
latter that these certificates represented all the stock of the company. 9
McShane apparently did not know that all the stock of the company had
been previously issued and thus was unaware of the existence of the first
set of certificates." Since McShane was unaware that the first set of certifi-
cates existed, he had no idea that the second set resembled the first. Under
the Richland Trust definition, the second set of certificates could not have
been an imitation "having a resemblance intended to deceive and be taken
for the original" 31 because McShane had never seen an original with which
to compare the second set of certificates. Rather, the second set of certifi-
cates was intended to be taken as representative of the interest in the
company that actually was conveyed by the first certificates. The defen-
dant wanted McShane to believe that he was pledging all the stock in the
corporation to McShane by selling McShane the certificates." Thus, while
the Fourth Circuit's holding in Pomponio can be justified under the pre-
vious Fourth Circuit definition of "counterfeit," the Pomponio decision
apparently cannot be justified under the more persuasive authority of the
Richland Trust definition.?
" 558 F.2d at 1173.
m The Pomponio court did not directly state that McShane had no knowledge of the first
set of certificates, but this lack of knowledge may be inferred. The court noted that the
cashier's check which Pomponio received upon cashing McShane's promissory note was ob-
tained by fraud. Id. at 1175. Had McShane known of the first set of certificates, then he would
have realized the value of the stock which the defendant offered him, and purchase of that
stock would not have been induced by fraud. Thus, McShane could not have known of the
first set of certificates.
31 See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
'2 In order to justify the Pomponio court's holding under the Richland Trust definition,
the word "original" in the Richland Trust definition of "counterfeiting" must be construed
to mean the original interest in the company rather than the original set of certificates. A
plain reading of the Richland Trust definition of "counterfeit" as "an imitation of a genuine
document having a resemblance intended to deceive and be taken for the original," 494 F.2d
at 643, quoted in 532 F.2d at 1224, reveals that the Richland Trust court intended for the
word "original" to refer to the document. There is no evidence in the definition that the word
"original" should refer to the interest represented by the document rather than to the docu-
ment itself. See Id. Furthermore, the Pomponio court gave no reason why the plain meaning
of the term "original" in the Richland Trust definition of "counterfeit" should be extended.
3 In contrast to Pomponio, the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in United States v.
Totaro, 550 F.2d 957 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920 (1977), was controlled by the
statutory definition of a crucial term in a federal criminal statute. In Totaro, the defendants
had arranged to extend two loans to a potential debtor at per annum interest rates of 300%
and 520% respectively. The defendant wrote the potential debtor a check in the amount of
$2,500 on the defendant's business account. When the potential debtor's business partner
tried to negotiate the check, the bank in which the defendant's account was established
refused to honor it for lack of sufficient funds. Throughout the transaction, the defendants
had made threats of force upon the potential debtor to induce repayment of the loan. Id. at
958.
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Difficulties with the incorporation of common law definitions into fed-
eral statutes also arise in the area of sentencing. The Fourth Circuit ad-
dressed one such problem in a recent decision construing a part of the
Youth Corrections Act. Since 1950, the Youth Corrections Act, or Y.C.A.,
has provided federal judges with a special sentencing system under which
the judges may exercise discretion in determining sentences for offenders
under the age of twenty-two. 5 The Y.C.A.'s purpose is to allow the sentenc-
ing judge to determine each youth offender's sentence according to the
rehabilitative needs of the individual offender.36 The judge has several
options under the Y.C.A. For example, he may choose to sentence the
individual under the Y.C.A. or any other applicable federal sentencing
provision. If a judge decides to sentence a youth offender under a provi-
sion other than the Y.C.A., however, he must first enter an express finding
that the offender would not benefit from sentencing under the Y.C.A.38
The defendants were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 892 (1970), which proscribes the
making of "an extortionate extension of credit." 18 U.S.C. § 891 (1970) states that for the
purpose of § 892, "to extend credit means to make or renew any loan, or to enter into any
agreement, tacit or express, whereby the repayment or satisfaction of any debt or claim...
may or will be deferred." See 550 F.2d at 958-59.
The defendants in Totaro claimed that since the potential debtor had received no money
there had been no extension of credit under § 892. The issue of whether a potential debtor's
failure to receive any money pursuant to an offer to extend an extortionate loan precludes a
conviction under § 892 was a novel issue. In holding that the defendants' actions did consti-
tute an extension of credit under § 892, the Totaro court relied partially on legislative history
which demonstrated the Congressional intent that the defendant's act should be covered by
§ 892, see CONF. REP. No. 1397, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& Au. NEWS 2025-2029, and partially on prior cases which have construed § 892 broadly. 550
F.2d at 959, citing United States v. Andrino, 501 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Annerino, 495 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Briola, 465 F.2d 1018 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); United States v. Keresty, 465 F.2d 36 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). However, the Totaro court relied primarily upon the plain
meaning of the definition of "extension of credit" in § 891, which states that a credit extension
can be a mere "agreement . . . whereby the repayment or satisfaction of any debt or claim
may or will be deferred." 550 F.2d at 959. Reception of money by the potential debtor
pursuant to the extortionate credit agreement is clearly not necessary to constitute an exten-
sion of credit under § 891; thus, defendants' convictions under § 892 were proper.
31 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1970).
1 See H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3983, 3983. F.Y.C.A. C1115, § 2, 64 Stat. 1085 (1950).
38 Id.
31 See 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1970). Under the sentencing section of the Y.C.A., a judge may
suspend a sentence and put the youth offender on probation, id. at § 5010(a), sentence the
offender to be placed under the custody of the Attorney General for special sentencing proce-
dures, id. at § 5010(b), or sentence the offender under an applicable procedure outside the
Y.C.A., id. at § 5010(d).
38 See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974). In Dorszynski, an appellant
under the age of 22 had been found guilty of possession of a controlled substance without
authorization under 21 U.S.C. § 884(a) (1970). The appellant had been sentenced under a
standard adult sentencing procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970), without reference to the Y.C.A.
418 U.S. at 429-30. The Supreme Court held that in order to sentence under other procedures
a person eligible to be sentenced under the Y.C.A., the sentencing judge must first make an
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In Jenkins v. United States,3" petitioner had been convicted of a crime
and sentenced without reference to the Y.C.A. Petitioner moved to have
his sentence vacated"0 since he had been sentenced without the required
"no benefit" finding. The evidence showed that petitioner had been
twenty-one years old at the time of the determination of his guilt and
twenty-two years old when his sentence was imposed. 1 The issue in
Jenkins was whether the Y.C.A. jurisdict'onal requirement is satisfied if
the offender is under the age of twenty-two at the time of a judicial deter-
mination of the offender's guilt or at the time of the offender's sentencing.
The Fourth Circuit held that the requirement is satisfied when an offender
is under the age of twenty-two at the time of determination of his guilt.2
The statutory language of the Y.C.A. relevant to age limitations seems
to require that the offender's age be determined at the time of his sentenc-
ing. 3 The Act applies only to the "youth offender,"" a term defined as a
"person under the age of twenty-two years at the time of conviction."45 In
addition, the definition of the term "conviction" is "the judgment on a
verdict or a finding of guilt, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere."''
The term "judgment," however, is not defined in the Y.C.A; in the absence
of a statutory definition, the common law meaning of the term is relevant.
The Supreme Court has held that the common law definition of
"judgment" is sentence. 7 The Jenkins court could have incorporated this
Supreme Court definition into the Act as the Y.C.A. definition of
"judgment" and held that the time of conviction under the Y.C.A. is the
time of sentencing." Nevertheless, a countervailing consideration pre-
cluded such construction by the Fourth Circuit.
The Jenkins court determined that the legislative history of the Y.C.A.
clearly demonstrates that the drafters of the Act intended that the term
"conviction" should mean judicial determination of guilt, and that the
court should not defeat the manifest legislative intent by incorporating the
express finding that the offender would derive no benefit from sentencing under the Y.C.A.
418 U.S. at 425. However, the court noted that the judge is not required to state his reasons
for this "no-benefit" finding. Id. at 426.
39 555 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1977).
41 The petitioner's motion to have sentence vacated was made under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1970).
" 555 F.2d at 1189.
42 Id. at 1190.
, See 555 F.2d at 1189.
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1970).
18 U.S.C. § 5006(e) (1970).
' 18 U.S.C. § 5006(h) (1970).
' In Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937), the Supreme Court ruled that a
dismissal of an appeal from a conviction for which petitioner had already been sentenced was
inappropriate. 302 U.S. at 212. The Court held that once a person has been sentenced, no
appeal from the conviction can be dismissed as interlocutory. Id. at 213. The Court noted
that an appeal can only be based upon a final judgment and that "the sentence is the
judgment." Id. at 212.
"8 See text accompanying note 49 infra.
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Supreme Court definition into the statute.49 Judge Widener, dissenting in
part, stated that the Y.C.A. clearly refers to "judgment" which plainly
means "time of sentencing" under the Supreme Court common law defini-
tion of judgment; the plain meaning of judgment as the time of sentencing
should control. 0 However, this rigid preference for statutory language to
the exclusion of all other considerations in the construction of statutes,
known as the "plain meaning rule," has lost much of its vitality.51
41 555 F.2d at 1189. An example of the belief that the term "conviction" means a determi-
nation of guilt is found in a letter from the Deputy Attorney General to the Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee. In the letter, the Deputy Attorney General wrote:
The measure would define a youth offender as a person under the age of 22 years
who has been convicted of an offense against the United States. While it would not
deprive the court of any of its present functions as to sentencing, the bill would
provide that, upon conviction, the court may place the youth offender on probation,
proceed under the Juvenile Delinquency Act, or sentence under any applicable
provision of law relating to the offense . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Id. at 1189-90, citing Letter from Deputy Attorney General Peyton Ford to House Judiciary
Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler (June 21, 1950), reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3983, 3991. The letter clearly indicates that the Deputy Attorney General re-
garded the terms "conviction" and "sentence" as separate concepts under the Y.C.A. See Id.
Another example of the Y.C.A. drafters' perception of a distinction between "sentence" and
"conviction" is a House of Representatives report which states that "[tihe proposed legisla-
tion is designed to make available for the discretionary use of the Federal judges a system
for the sentencing and treatment of persons under the age of 22 years who have been convicted
of crime in the United States courts . . ." H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 1,
reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & A. NEws 3983, 3983. See 555 F.2d at 1189. The cited
materials demonstrate that the Y.C.A. drafters did not intend that the term "conviction" in
the Y.C.A. should be construed to mean "sentence." Rather, the Y.C.A. drafters obviously
used the term "conviction" to indicate a judicial determination of guilt. See Id.
Id. at 1192 (Widener, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). Judge Widener sup-
ported his contention that clear statutory language controls statutory construction by citing
United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932). In Shreveport, the
appellant had been convicted of violating a federal statute prohibiting the misbranding of
food or drugs distributed in interstate commerce. The appellant's defense was based on his
assertion that the legislative history of the bill clearly proscribed a conviction under the
circumstances of the case. Id. at 81-82. However, the Supreme Court found the statutory
language clear and therefore controlling. Id. at 83.
" See Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The 'Plain-Meaning Rule' and Statutory Inter-
pretation in the 'Modern' Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Murphy]. The case most responsible for the demise of strict application of the plain
meaning rule is United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534 (1940). The
holding in American Trucking was controlled by the definition of the term "employer" in §
204 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Ch. 498, § 204, 44 Stat. 543 (1935). Although the meaning
of the term seemed clear upon the face of the statute, the legislative history of the Motor
Carrier Act demonstrated that Congress intended that "employee" should mean something
other than the obvious meaning. The American Trucking Court held that the manifest legisla-
tive intent controlled over statutory language. 310 U.S. at 543-44.
The plain meaning rule has been criticized by American legal scholars who argue that
rigid application of the doctrine frustrates the purpose of the courts to "ascertain and effec-
tuate the intention of the legislature." Murphy, supra, at 1299. Furthermore, some commen-
tators insist that the concept that every word has one fixed taxonomic legal meaning is clearly
incorrect. See Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 407, 409
(1950); Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal
[Vol. XXXV
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
The Fourth Circuit's determination that Y.C.A. jurisdiction extends to
persons who are under the age of twenty-two at the time of a judicial
determination of guilt is in harmony with the decisions of other federal
courts.2 However, the Jenkins court's decision that "conviction" under the
Y.C.A. means determination of guilt seems inconsistent with the Fourth
Circuit's holding in United States v. Bailey.3 Bailey concerned the appeals
of several individuals convicted of a bank robbery." In discussing the ap-
peal of one of the defendants, the court stated that he "was 22 years of age
at the time sentence was passed upon him and hence not within the man-
dates of the Youth Corrections Act."" This determination has an implicit
holding that "conviction" under the Y.C.A. means "sentence." Thus,
Jenkins and Bailey seem irreconcilable."
Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2, 4 (1939). Therefore, extrinsic aids such as legislative history
should be used by courts in order to determine the sense in which a legislator uses a term in
a statute. See MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 759 (1966). If such extrinsic
aids may not be utilized by courts, then the legislator must stipulate a meaning for every
term which he uses, therby raising the need to further explain the meaning of the stipulated
words. Id. Access by courts to sources outside the statutes to determine legislative intent
would eliminate the necessity of stipulation.
" The Ninth Circuit, in Standley v. United States, 318 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1963), allowed
a convicted individual to be sentenced under the provisions of the Y.C.A. since the trial judge,
under 18 U.S.C. § 4209 (1958), had made a specific finding that the procedure would benefit
the offender. 318 F.2d at 701. However, the court made it clear that because the offender was
"twenty-two years, ten months of age, on the date of his 'conviction,' i.e., his plea of guilty"
he was not entitled to sentencing under the Y.C.A. as a matter of right. Id. This dictum
clearly indicates that the Ninth Circuit regards "conviction" under the Y.C.A. to mean the
time of a judicial determination of guilt.
The Jenkins holding is also consistent with the District of Columbia Circuit's holding in
United States v. Branic, 495 F.2d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Branic court held that a person
aged twenty-one at the time of the jury verdict and twenty-two at the time of the sentencing
must be given an opportunity to be sentenced under the provisions of the Y.C.A. Id. at 1070.
In reaching this decision, the District of Columbia Circuit relied on the rationale of United
States v. Carter, 225 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1964). The Carter court held that the term
"conviction" in the Y.C.A. meant a finding of guilt. Id. at 567. The Carter court determined
that the objective of the act was to further the meaningful rehabilitation of the youth of-
fender, and a finding that "conviction" meant "sentence" would decrease the number of
offenders eligible for the program. Id. at 568. Also, the Carter court presented the idea that
if conviction meant sentencing, then time considerations might induce judges to make hasty
decisions and sentence immediately persons found guilty of a crime who were just under 22
years of age in order for those sentences to be made under the Y.C.A. Such judicial haste
could result in sentencing errors. Id.; see United States v. Kleinzahler, 306 F. Supp. 311, 313-
14 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (Carter reasoning employed to hold that "conviction" means determina-
tion of guilt).
509 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1975).
" The defendants had been convicted of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970).
509 F.2d at 883. The Jenkins court did not indicate that the defendant was also 22
years old at the time of the determination of his guilt.
- The Jenkins court held that applicability of the Y.C.A. should be based on the of-
fender's age at the time of the determination of his guilt, but this seems to conflict with the
earlier Bailey decision, which apparently ruled that Y.C.A. applicability is based on the
offender's age at the time of his sentencing. The Jenkins court tried to harmonize the Jenkins
and Bailey cases by referring to language in Bailey which stated that another defendant was
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The disposition of the Jenkins case, however, seems proper. The court's
decision is consistent with the manifest legislative intent of the Y.C.A.'s
drafters and with the holdings of other federal courts that have defined
"conviction" under the Y.C.A.5 7 The Jenkins court could have avoided the
inconsistency with the Bailey decision by directly overruling the pertinent
part of Bailey.
B. Interstate Criminal Activity
In United States v. Williams, I the Fourth Circuit held that the theft of
gasoline from a storage tank, the terminus of a spur line2 connected to an
interstate pipeline system, constituted theft of goods moving in interstate
commerce in a pipeline system under section 659 of the criminal code.
3
under the age of 22 at the time of his conviction and hence subject to Y.C.A. sentence
provisions. However, this reference does not reconcile Jenkins and Bailey. The inconsistency
between the two cases it that the Bailey court apparently defined "conviction" to mean
sentencing under the Y.C.A., and the Jenkins court defined "conviction" to mean a judicial
determination of guilt under the same act. The Bailey court's statement that a defendant
was subject to Y.C.A. sentencing provisions because he was 22 years old at the time of his
conviction does not reveal which definition of the term "conviction" the court employed in
reference to the sentencing of this defendant and thus does not diminish the impact of the
implicit holding that conviction means sentence.
, The Fourth Circuit recently decided another case in the area of federal sentencing
procedure. In Goodson v. United States, 564 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1977), the Fourth Circuit
held that the admission of evidence of allegedly illegal prior convictions at a sentencing
hearing is not a proper ground for resentencing the defendant if the judge finds that the
determination of the sentence was unaffected by the allegedly improper evidence. Id. at 1072.
The defendant contended in Goodson that his resentencing was necessary because the
sentencing judge in the district court had considered allegedly unconstitutional prior convic-
tions in determining this sentence. Id. The defendant's contention was based on United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that evidence of prior
unconstitutional convictions may not be considered by a federal sentencing judge because
such a consideration might affect the length or nature of the sentence imposed by the judge.
Id. at 448-49. The Tucker Court determined that if such prior unconstitutional convictions
affecting sentencing were considered by the sentencing judge, the defendant has a right to a
resentencing hearing in which the offensive prior convictions are not considered. Id. In order
to comply with Tucker, while avoiding needless resentencing hearings due to harmless errors,
the Fourth Circuit held, in Stepheney v. United States, 516 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1975), that an
individual is not entitled to a resentencing hearing because of the admission of evidence of
unconstitutional prior convictions at his sentencing when the judge makes a specific finding
that his knowledge of the questioned convictions did not affect the determination of the
sentence. Id. at 9.
In Goodson, the district court specifically found that the length of petitioner's sentence
had not been affected by the court's knowledge of the allegedly unconstitutional convictions.
564 F.2d at 1072. This finding fully complied with Stepheney. Thus, petitioner was not
entitled to a resentencing hearing because he had not been harmed by the court's knowledge
of allegedly illegal prior convictions at his sentencing. Id.
559 F.2d 1243 (4th Cir. 1977).
2 See text accompanying note 5 infra.
559 F.2d at 1248. 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1970) provides, in part, that
Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes, carries away, or conceals, or
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Since the evidence had shown that the defendant had stolen gasoline from
a storage tank with intent to convert it to his own use,4 the Williams court
considered only whether the storage tank was a part of a pipeline system
and whether the gasoline stolen was in interstate commerce under section
659. The Fourth Circuit determined that the district court jury in Williams
could have concluded reasonably that the storage tank from which the
gasoline had been stolen was part of a pipeline system because of the tank's
function in the gasoline distribution process.' The pipeline, owned by Colo-
nial, ran from Texas to North Carolina. Gasoline left the main line in
North Carolina and entered a spur line where part of the gas from the spur
line emptied into the storage tank from which the gasoline was stolen.'
This physical connection between the spur line and the storage tank was
an important element in the demonstration that the storage facility was
part of the pipeline system. The transient nature of the gasoline also indi-
cated that the gasoline was stolen from a part of the pipeline system.
7
In order to sustain a conviction under section 659, the government also
had to demonstrate that the gas stolen from the storage tank was in inter-
state commerce. A preliminary consideration was whether the temporary
halt in the transporting of the gasoline as it sat in the storage tank placed
the gasoline outside the scope of interstate commerce. The court deter-
mined that in order to sustain a conviction under section 659, the stolen
goods did not have to be in motion at the time of the theft.'
by fraud or deception obtains from any pipeline system. . . with intent to convert
to his own use any goods ... moving as or which are part of or which constitute
an interstate or foreign shipment of freight, express, or other property . . . [s]hall
in each case be fined. . . or imprisoned ...
The references to "pipeline system" and "storage tank" were added to § 659 in 1966 to afford
the same protection to gasoline carriers given to other interstate carriers. See H.R. REP. No.
2144, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3271, 3271.
4 559 F.2d at 1246.
'Id. at 1248.
£ The storage tank was owned by Cities Service and Amoco, the company from which
the gas was stolen. Id.
7 The jury's finding of the transient nature of the gasoline is supported by the fact that
gasoline stored in the tank generally did not remain in the storage tank for longer than four
days before being pumped into delivery trucks. Id. The gasoline which was stolen had been
in the tank only twenty-four hours when it was taken. Id. The constant flow of gas in and
out of the tank strongly indicated that the storage tank was more a part of the pipeline system
than an independent storage terminal in which the gasoline company deposited its gas.
Finally, gasoline could not be pumped directly from the spur line into delivery trucks, but
had to be pumped first into the storage tank and then pumped into the trucks. Since gasoline
moving through the pipeline could only be dispersed from the tank, the storage facility could
be viewed as an integral, necessary part of the pipeline system: Id.
s559 F.2d at 1247; see United States v. Astolas, 487 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 955 (1974); United States v. Gollin, 176 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, sub. nom
Richman v. United States, 388 U.S. 848 (1949). Both Gollin and Astolas involved manufactur-
ers who shipped their own goods. In both cases, the trucks were loaded and then moved a
short distance around the manufacturers' plants in preparation for out-of-state transporta-
tion. As the trucks sat on company property awaiting the trip, thieves broke into the vehicles
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The court also had to consider that the storage tank from which the
'gasoline had been stolen was partially owned by Amoco, the owner of the
stolen gas. The gasoline had thus passed from the control of the interstate
shipper, Colonial, to the control of the owner, Amoco. This transfer of
control of the gasoline before it was stolen is significant because of a long-
standing rule of interstate commerce that the interstate character of a
shipment ends when the consignee accepts delivery of the goods from the
consignor? This rule is applied in the Eighth Circuit,'0 and possibly the
Sixth Circuit." The rule that acceptance of delivery by the consignee ends
interstate transportation, however, has been repudiated by the Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.'" Following the latter rule, the
Fourt Circuit has determined that the interstate character of a shipment
of goods is a practical consideration, depending upon the circumstances
surrounding the shipment.'"
and stole the goods. In each case, the minor movement around the plant was held to be the
start of the interstate journey; the fact that the trucks had temporarily stopped did not alter
the interstate character of the movement or prevent a conviction under § 659. 487 F.2d at
279; 176 F.2d at 893. The gasoline in Williams, while sitting in the storage tank, was tempo-
rarily stopped in interstate movement similar to the stop in Astolas and Gollin.
See O'Kelley v. United States, 116 F.2d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1941).
ID See Id. In O'Kelley, the consignees of a shipment of goods from Louisiana to Arkansas
accepted delivery. Before the consignee could move the goods from the railroad car in which
they had been shipped, the goods were stolen. Id. at 967. The Eighth Circuit held that the
fact that the consignee had accepted delivery meant that the goods were no longer in inter-
state commerce. Id. at 968.
1 See United States v. Yoppolo, 535 F.2d 435 (6th Cir. 1970); Winer v. United States,
228 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1956).
In Yoppolo, a shipment of liquor was stolen as it was being transported by the shipper.
The appellant asserted as a defense that the liquor had been accepted by the consignee, and
had therefore not been in interstate commerce at the time of the theft. 435 F.2d at 626. The
Yoppolo court did not question the appellant's argument that acceptance by the consignee
ends interstate commerce, but asserted that the argument lacked evidentiary support. Id.
Thus, in Yoppolo the Sixth Circuit implicitly reaffirmed its position in Winer that
acceptance by the consignee constitutes an end to interstate commerce. In Winer, the court
implied that when the consignee accepts delivery of goods stolen from a railroad freight car
the goods are no longer in interstate commerce. Acceptance by the consignee was labeled a
"controlling consideration." 228 F.2d at 948.
2 See United States v. Gates, 528 F.2d 1045, 1047 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839
(1976); United States v. Parent, 484 F.2d 726, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
923 (1974); United States v Gimelstob, 475 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828
(1973); United States v. Padilla; 457 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Cousins,
427 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Maddox, 394 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.
1968). In the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, the test for determining "whether a ship-
ment is in interstate commerce at a given time is essentially a practical one, depending upon
the relationship between the consignee, consignor, and carrier, the indicia of interstate com-
merce at the time the theft occurs, and the preservation of the congressional intent." 427 F.2d
at 385, quoted in 528 F.2d at 1047; 484 F.2d at 729.
" See United States v. Maddox, 394 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir. 1968). In Maddox, sugar
had been shipped from overseas to Baltimore, where it was stored in a warehouse, under the
control of the consignee, awaiting out-of-state shipment pursuant to pre-existing contracts.
The Maddox court held that the theft of the sugar from the warehouse was a violation of §
659. Id. at 300. The court specifically noted that the consignee's control over the sugar and
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The Williams court found that many of the facts important to the jury's
determination that the storage tank was part of the pipeline system were
also relevant to the finding that the gasoline had been in interstate com-
merce at the time of its theft. Perhaps the most important factor, in the
opinion of the court, was the fact that the gasoline had only been in the
tank for 24 hours and was scheduled to be delivered to a predetermined
pool of purchasers."
C. Jurisdiction under Drug and Customs Laws
The Fourth Circuit also recently decided a case involving a jurisdic-
tional overlap between Title 19 Customs Laws and Title 21 Drug Laws in
which clear statutory language was the dispositive factor. In Taylor v.
United States, I the Fourth Circuit held that procedures for an award claim
based on the report to government officials of the presence of illegal drugs
aboard a ship on the high seas are governed by the drug laws, which
incorporate certain customs laws.2 The Taylor court also decided that the
proper basis for calculating such an award would be the value of the drug
on the severely regulated legal market created by the medicinal use of the
drug.
3
The appellant in Taylor was a merchant seaman who discovered hash-
ish aboard his ship while the ship was at sea.4 Hashish, a marijuana deriva-
tive, is included under Title 21 as marijuana,5 a Schedule I controlled
substance.' Schedule I substances have a high potential for abuse, no
consequential power to divert the sugar from its predetermined channels was a relevant, but
not controlling factor in the determination of whether the sugar had been in interstate com-
merce at the time of its theft. Id. at 299.
"4 The Williams court supported its contention that an owner's temporary storage of his
goods prior to movement to a pre-determined point does not necessarily terminate the inter-
state character of the movement by citing United States v. Padilla, 457 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir.
1972). In Padilla, goods were stolen from a J.C. Penney warehouse in Stockton, California.
The goods had been manufactured in the Far East and shipped to California. Id. at 1404. By
applying the totality of circumstances test the court found that the goods were still in foreign
commerce since the goods had not reached their final destination and were subject to the
order of the consignee. Id. at 1405. The Williams court correctly pointed out that the situation
was analogous to the facts of the instant case. See 559 F.2d at 1248-49 n.3. The gas in the
storage tank had reached a temporary halt in its movement, subject to further movement at
the order of the owner.
550 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1977).
2 Id. at 997.
Id. at 988-90.
The hashish was hidden in a stereo speaker that appellant had agreed to place on his
customs list for a fellow seaman. The other seaman had agreed to transport the speaker for a
man he had met in the last foreign port where the ship had docked. Id. at 985.
Under 21 U.S.C. § 802(15) (1970), the term marijuana includes all forms, derivates,
seeds and compounds thereof. Furthermore, 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d) (1977) declares that the
term marijuana includes "any mixture or substance which contains any trace of marijuana."
1 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) Sched. I(c)(10) (1970).
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presently accepted medical value in treatment, and no safety standards
under which they can be used! The appellant reported the hashish to
authorities,' and claimed an award equal to 25% of the street value of the
hashish under applicable Customs Laws?
The issue faced by the Taylor court was whether the federal customs
laws or the federal drug laws of the United States Code governed the case.
The court held that while consideration of customs laws section 1619 was
necessary to its decision, primary attention had to be focused on section
881(d) of the drug laws. " The thrust of section 881(d) is that customs laws
prevail as long as they do not conflict or overlap with the drug laws. When
the conflict or overlap does exist, the drug laws supersede the customs
laws. The court thus faced the necessity of determining whether the Taylor
situation involved any overlapping provision of the drug laws which would
take precedence over section 1619 of the customs laws.
Schedule I substances are subject to seizure by the United States," and
the drug laws prescribe how the Attorney General may dispose of such
confiscated substances. 2 The drug laws provide for payment by the Attor-
ney General to persons who give information regarding a violation of the
drug laws. The amount of this payment under Title 21 is an "appropriate"
sum, as determined by the Attorney General. 3 An appropriate compensa-
tion for reporting a violation of a customs law is 25% of the value of the
21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(1970). Importation of Schedule I substances is illegal unless the
Attorney General makes an express authorization allowing such action, and even this authori-
zation is limited to certain circumstances. In order for the Attorney General to allow strictly
limited importation of Schedule I drugs under this section, he must find a scientific, medical,
or other legitimate need for the substance; furthermore, to authorize the importation, the
Attorney General must find a domes tic shortage of the drug or an inability of domestic
manufacturers to produce sufficient quantities of the substance. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1970).
' The appellant reported his discovery to his captain, who took possession of the mari-
juana and turned the drug over to customs officials and Drug Enforcement Administration
officials when the ship docked in New Orleans. 550 F.2d at 985.
The applicable part of 19 U.S.C. § 1619 (1970) reads:
Any persons not an officer of the United States who detects and seizes any...
merchandise . . . subject to seizure and forfeiture under the customs laws or the
navigation laws, and who reports the same to an officer of the customs, or who
furnishes. . . original information concerning any fraud upon the customs revenue,
or a violation of the customs laws or the navigation laws, perpetrated or contem-
plated which detection and seizure or information leads to a recovery of any duties
withheld, or of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture incurred, may be awarded . . . a
compensation of 25 per centum of the net amount recovered, but not to exceed
$50,000. ...
10 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1970).
, See 21 U.S.C. § 881(0 (1970).
,2 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1970) provides that when property is forfeited under subchapter
13, Title 21, of the drug laws, the Attorney General may retain the property for official use,
require that the General Services Administration take and dispose of the property, or give
the property to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for disposition for scientific or
medical purposes under rules specified by the Attorney General.
13 See 21 U.S.C. § 886(a) (1970).
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seized goods. 4 Thus, the Taylor court held that the appellant should be
paid 25% of the value of the seized hashish.'5 Therefore, the Attorney
General's power to compensate an informer for reporting illegal drugs is
governed by drug law, while the actual basis for the amount of compensa-
tion in Taylor was to be derived from customs law.
Since Title 21 drug laws were applicable to the situation, the regulation
established by the Drug Enforcement Administration (D.E.A.) pursuant
to Title 21 was relevant. The applicable D.E.A. regulation states that the
"domestic value shall be considered the retail price at which such or simi-
lar property is freely offered for sale."'" Marijuana is not freely offered for
sale on the street, but is secretly offered to persons as contraband. There-
fore, the steet value of the hashish could not be used in calculating the
appellant's award.
Petitioner in the lower court had not offered any evidence that hashish
had any medicinal value. The Fourth Circuit, however, decided that this
failure by appellant would not be fatal to his cause of action since there
was a lack of authority indicating that a free market for the hashish existed
when this action commenced. The court did not hold that such a retail
market in fact existed, but determined that petitioner should be given a
chance to establish its existence," based on new evidence regarding the
medicinal use of marijuana.'8 Accordingly, the appellant would have the
burden of proving the existence of a free market for marijuana upon re-
mand.
Conclusion
The Fourth Circuit generally followed established precedent in decid-
ing recent cases under common law and by statutory construction. The
holdings in both Jones and Pomponio, concerning the federal criminal
prosciption against interstate transportation of forged and counterfeited
instruments, were strictly limited to the facts. The seemingly strained
reasoning applied by the Fourth Circuit in determining that a common law
forgery had not occurred in Jones, but that a common law counterfeiting
" See 19 U.S.C. § 1619 (1970); note 61 supra.
" 550 F.2d at 988.
'e 21 C.F.R. § 1316.74 (1977).
,7 Title 21 does allow the Attorney General to authorize the importation of Schedule I
substances in certain situations. See 21 U.S.C. § 952(a)(2) (1970). The Federal Regulations
recognize the right of authorized individuals to conduct research using Schedule I substances.
See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.22(b) (3) (1977). Thus, the court decided that the appellant may be able
to establish the existence of a retail market upon which to calculate his claimed award. 550
F.2d at 990.
,1 Researchers have accumulated strong evidence that marijuana may be used in the near
future as a treatment for glaucoma, see Newsweek, November 8, 1976, at 53, and asthma and
related respiratory ailments, see Science News, July 24, 1976, at 55. Other researchers believe
that marijuana may prove very helpful for controlling vomiting and nausea and for stimulat-
ing appetites of people undergoing chemotherapy treatment for cancer. See Science News,
Oct. 25, 1975, at 262. Thus, there may soon be a legal market for valuation of marijuana.
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